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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND THE CENSOR*
Freedom of expression is the slogan of a new wave of permis-
siveness in our society. A new standard of sexual mores is
developing. An unprecedented degree of candor can be found in
literature, and in all fields of entertainment. A new era of
iconoclasm has shattered many of the moral and social taboos
surrounding sex and nudity. It is in this context that the law is
struggling to establish the boundaries of freedom of expression
and the degree of censorship that is permissible. In the develop-
ment of these boundaries, the formulation of a workable defini-
tion of obscenity is vital, and the future of censorship will
largely depend on the standard adopted. This paper will in-
vestigate the trend toward a greater freedom of expression and
the effect this trend will have on the role of the censor.
I. ToPiEssNESS AND THE CENSOR
One of the most effective weapons of the censor is the licensing
power.1 The area in which licensing exerts its greatest regula-
tory power is in the field of alcoholic beverage sales:
The business of selling intoxicating liquor is one at-
tended with dangers, and under the police power the
state may limit the operation of such business to con-
ditions which will minimize its evils.
2
However, this power wanes as the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control moves into the shadowy area which often
divides conduct, which the department can properly regulate,
from expression, which is beyond the scope of the department's
authority. The California Court of Appeals case, Boreta Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Contro3 illu-
strates both the broad power such a department may have in
*Boreta Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 79, -- P2d - (Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1969).
1. "The need to obtain a permit or a license for first amendment related
conduct such as parading or picketing presents an identical situation [prior
censorship]. By manipulating the procedures through which approval is given,
the state is able to discourage different types of communicative activity." Note,
The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808, 827 (1969).
2. Farah v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 159 Cal. App.2d 335, 338,
324 P.2d 9R. 101 (Dist. Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1958).
3. 75 Cal. Rptr. 79,- P.2d- (Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1969).
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regulating conduct in restaurants and bars, and also the problems
encountered when it tries to regulate "entertainment."
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control in Boreta
attempted to revoke a liquor license on the grounds that the use
of "topless" waitresses was offensive conduct in itself and, there-
fore, contrary to public welfare or morals. The court, however,
held that the display of bare female bosoms alone did not estab-
lish that the bar was a "disorderly house." No improper conduct
was shown that would warrant such a conclusion. The court
decided the case solely on the issue of whether the conduct of
the waitresses was "injurious to the public morals, health, con-
venience or safety... .' The court stated that without proof of
offensive conduct the attempt to revoke the license was an
arbitrary exercise of power and could not be condoned. The
court also pointed out that while the department has the duty
to maintain standards not contrary to public welfare or morals,
this does not include the power to decide what customers may
see:
These principles do not give the department the arbi-
trary power to act as the arbiter of what patrons may
observe. No one who does not consider such a display
and exposure clean and wholesome is required to patron-
ize the licensee's establishment.5
As the court observed, to permit such regulation would present
"some constitutional problems."6
In Boreta, the court cites many situations in which the Depart-
ment of Alcoholic Beverage Control can properly revoke a liquor
license. The standard utilized is the production of sufficient
evidence to establish that the place under investigation is a
"disorderly house":
[I]n order for premises to constitute a disorderly
house there must be improper acts committed on the
premises. The mere presence of those who might engage
in proscribed conduct elsewhere cannot even be grounds
for legislation penalizing the licensee. Overt acts of
impropriety are required.
7
4. Id. at 89.
5. Id. at 95.
6. Id. at 97.
7. Id. at 89.
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Among the "overt acts" deemed sufficient for the revocation
of a license are the employment of girls to loiter in bars and
solicit drinks,8 the fact that an establishment is in an area of
high incidence of arrest for drunkenness, 9 the solicitation by
prostitutes on the premises,10 the congregation of homosexuals
or lesbians,1 and the presence of gambling.12
The Bareta court insisted that freedom of expression was not
involved because the regulation of "topless" waitresses concerns
itself only with the "manner in which alcoholic beverages may
be served" :13
The employment of "topless" waitresses has been deemed
entertainment for local licensing purposes. (citation
omitted). It has been recognized, however, that there
is a distinction between the power of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board to proscribe by regulation the
use of bare-breasted female waitresses to attract busi-
ness to cocktail bars, saloons, and restaurants which serve
alcoholic beverages, and the proprietor's right to con-
duct such activities as entertainment which may be
carried out without the serving of liquor.
14
However, an ordinance requiring that establishments employ-
ing "topless" waitresses must obtain special licenses drew un-
successful constitutional attack in Robins v. County of Los
Angles.'5 In Robins, the court upheld the ordinance, stating
that there was no interference with freedom of expression since
the ordinance deals with the "commercial aspects of a business
8. Garda v. Munro, 161 Cal. App. 2d 425, 326 P2d 894 (Dist Ct. App., 1st
Dist. 1958) ; Karides v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 164 Cal. App. 2d
549, 331 P.2d 145 (Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1958).
9. Torres v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 192 Cal. App. 2d 541,13
Cal. Rptr. 531 (Dist. Ct App., 4th Dist. 1961).
10. Munson v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 248 Cal. App. 2d 598,
56 Cal. Rptr. 805 (Dist. Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1967); Los Robles Motor Lodge,
Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 246 Cal. App. 2d 198, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (Dist. Ct App., 3d Dist. 1966).
11. Benedetti v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 187 Cal. App. 2d 213,
9 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist 1960). But see Vallerga v. Depart-
ment of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 53 Cal2d 313, 1 Cal. Rptr. 494, 347 P.2d 909
(1959) in which the court states that evidence of the display of sexual urges
and desires must be present, rather than merely showing that the bar was a re-
sort for a certain class of persons.
12. Maloney v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 172 Cal. App. 2d 104,
342 P.2d 520 (Dist. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1959).
13. Id. at 88.
14. Id. at 88.
15. Robins v. County of Los Angeles, 248 Cal. App. 2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 853
(Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1966).
1970]
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enterprise .... 10  The court felt that the exposure of the naked
breast should be reasonably regulated until such practice be-
comes socially acceptable. It is probable that similar challenges
will arise in the future.'
7
Boreta illustrates the ease with which a licensing board can
tread on constitutional rights. In Bor'eta, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control had promulgated no definite rule or
regulation that could cover the Boreta situation. The brunt of
the department's argument had to be based on a "policy state-
ment." The court at several points noted the potential un-
constitutionality involved:
... [W]here, as here, there is no legislative proscription
with respect to the conduct complained of, and no rule
or regulation regarding it has been promulgated by the
department, the licensee must determine for himself
whether he will pursue a course of conduct which has
not been regulated or subjected to any standards. If he
elects to do so, he runs the risk of a subsequent deter-
mination by the department that in its discretion his
conduct was contrary to public welfare or morals. When
it so acts, the department functions as a censor, and
however lofty its motives may be, acts arbitrarily and
in a manner not contemplated by the constitution.18
The court also revealed the potential constitutional issue in-
volved in Boreta when it pointed out that while the only way to
regulate "innocent activities" such as those involved in Boreta
is by statute or rule, the court was not called upon to determine
the "validity or constitutionality of any particular rule. . .."19
The court carefully retreated from any statement concerning the
constitutionality of a future department rule restricting "topless"
waitresses.
While Boreta is not an example of censorship in the ordinary
sense, it represents an area in which an agency designed to
regulate conduct can move into the realm of expression.20 As the
Supreme Court has stated, "[it is characteristic of the freedoms
16. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
17. Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity, 41 Rocxy MT. L. Ray. 1, 52 (1969)
noting that one such challenge reached the Supreme Court's 1968-1969 docket.
18. Boreta Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 75
Cal. Rptr. 79, 100 (Ct. App., 1st Dist. 1969).
19. Id. at 98.
20. Id. at 87. In Boreta an obscenity charge was dropped by the department.
Such a charge would have squarely raised a freedom of expression issue.
[Vol. '22
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of expression in general that they are vulnerable to gravely dam-
aging yet barely visible encroachments."2 ' Once any regulatory
body enters the area of pure expression, as opposed to conduct,
the power of censorship is greatly curbed. This area is con-
trolled by the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and press which protect expression and dissemination of ideas
and is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. These guarantees are abridged only in instances of sedi-
tion or obscenity. 2
2
II. OBSCEMY, rna P FORMING ARTS, AND TE CENS R
The states have the power to regulate amusements and exhibi-
tions to the extent that such regulation does not encroach on the
area of control granted to the Federal Government in this field
by the constitution. The first amendment charges the Federal
Government to protect free speech and press against any regula-
tion. However, the first admendment guarantees do not protect
all speech or all expression, and suppression of material which is
obscene, lewd, indecent and immoral is allowed.23 Today, the
power of the censor to suppress what he deems "obscene" is be-
coming increasingly limited as the Supreme Court definition of
obscenity becomes increasingly restrictive.
The performing arts were first placed within the purview of
the first and fourteenth amendments' guarantees in Burstyn v.
Wilson 24 which involved the attempted censorship of a motion
picture as "sacrilegious". The Court stated that the role of our
government does not include suppressing any "real or imagined
attacks upon a particular religious doctrine" 26 and therefore a
motion picture could not be banned because a censor deemed it
"sacrilegious." 28
In the opinion, the Court cited Near v. Minnesota27 as the
guideline for the proper instances in which prior restraint might
be utilized. In Near, the Court recognized two areas for such
prior restraint: obscenity and sedition.28  Therefore, Burstyn
brought motion picture censorship as well as censorship in
21. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
22. Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity, 41 RocKY Mr. L. R-v. 1, 1 (1969).
23. Adams Newark Theatre Co. v. Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 126 A.2d 340 (1956),
affd, 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
24. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
25. Id. at 505.
26. Id. at 506.
27. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
28. Id. at 716.
19701 ..
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analogous forms of entertainment, theatre and television, into
the struggle of establishing a. definition of obscenity that would
regulate the degree of expression permissible through these
mediums.
The standard of obscenity used until recently is that of Both v.
Uvited States:
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the ma-
terial taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests.2 9
However, the Roth definition was not exclusive.30 In Manual
Enterprises Ino. v. Day,31 the Court stated that prurient in-
terest appeal alone was not the proper test for obscenity and that
"patent offensiveness" of the material must also be shown. In
Jacobelis v. Ohio, 2 the Court decided that material can not be
proscribed unless it is shown to be "'utterly' without social im-
portance." The Memoirs decision stated that the three elements of
"patent offensiveness", "prurient interest", and "utterly without
social importance" must coalesce before the obscenity of any ma-
terial can be found.33 Thus, through a process of grafting onto
the Roth test, the Court has reached a highly restrictive test for
obscenity.
The Roth definition itself has been subject to definition of its
terms, most importantly in respect to "the average person" and
"contemporary community standards." The Court has stated
that these two terms are to be determined on a national standard
of society at large or people in general as opposed to a local or
state standard in determining the constitutional criteria of
obscenity.3 4 The implementation of a national standard insures
a uniform concept of obscenity which changes with the tenor of
the times, not the town or county.
With the Ginzberg v. United States3U and Mishkin v. New
York" decisions, criteria for obscenity have been developed to
handle unusual situations which the general test for obscenity is
29. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
30. See Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity (pts. 1-2), 41 RocKy MT. L.
REv. 1, 201 (1969); Haimbaugh, Obscenity, and End to Weighing?, 21 S.C.L.
Rnv. 357 (1969).
31. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
32. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
33. A Book Named, "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
34. Jacobelis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
35. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
36. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
[Vol. ' 2
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unable to effectively regulate. Ginzberg added the criteria of
pandering or "commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the
sake of their prurient appeal."37 This test made it possible to
suppress materials whose subject matter itself might not be
obscene, but which because of the obvious effort, as witnessed
through production, sale, and publicity to emphasize solely the
sexually provocative aspects and to create a salacious aura for
the material, has the overall effect of purely an appeal to the
prurient interest.
Mishkin elaborated the scope of "prurient interest" to encom-
pass deviant sexual groups. The Court stated that if it were clear
that the material were consumed by and designed for a deviant
sexual group as opposed to the general public, the test for
obscenity is the appeal to such a group's prurient interest
measured by the appeal to the particular or peculiar interest in
sex of the members of the deviant group.38
The effect of the Court's attempts to formulate a standard is
one of increased permissibility in the area of freedom of ex-
pression. The criteria for obscenity are guided and created by
the Court's adherence to the theory that as long as some attempt
to convey an idea is found or some evidence of an intellectual
effort is discernible, the constitutional protection of the first
amendment is warranted.3 9
Licensing
While the new definitions of obscenity themselves are making
it increasingly difficult for any form of police power to brand
material as obscene and thus to regulate it, the Court has also
attacked the very core of censorship-the licensing power or prior
restraint. Near v. Minnesota began this attack by stating that
the primary purpose of the first amendment is to prevent pre-
vious restraints upon publication:
The exceptional nature of its (first amendment's)
limitations places in a strong light the general concep-
tion that liberty of the press, historically considered
and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant
principally, although not exclusively, immunity from
previous restraints or censorship. 40
37. Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 466 (1966).
38. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
39. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360
U.S. 684 (1959) ; United States v. A Motion Picture Entitled "I Am Curious-
Yellow," 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
1970]
7
Pressly: Freedom of Expression and the Censor
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTH CAROLINA LAW RFv[mw
In Near, the Court stated that the object of the statute in-
volved was to suppress a newspaper or periodical rather than
punish it, and therefore violated first amendment guarantees.
In the entertainment field, the issue of prior restraint has been
dealt with most frequently in motion picture cases. The whole
scheme of the requirement of securing a license before showing
a motion picture came under fire in Time Film Corporation v.
Chicago.41 It was argued that all motion pictures should be
shown without any prior submission of the film to any licensing
authority and that the state's remedy lay in the criminal process
if there were any offense. The Court rejected this sweeping
attack noting the privilege against prior restraint is not absolute
and that obscenity has never been sanctioned under the Con-
sitution. The Court stated that the state had the power to devise
the system it deemed most effective in combating obscenity but
added: "(we), of course, are not holding that city officials may
be granted the power to prevent the showing of any motion
picture they deem unworthy of a license." 42
While Time Film upheld this scheme of censorship, the pro-
cedural aspects of the licensing power were sharply curtailed in
rfreedmanr v. Maryland.43 The Court held that the Maryland
licensing procedure was unconstitutional due to the fact of the
built-in risk of delay in securing the license which in itself be-
comes a restraint of freedom of expression. The Court set out
broad but demanding guidelines for censorship proceedings:
[T]he exhibitor must be assured, by statute or author-
itative judicial construction, that the censor will, within
a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to
court to restrain showing the film. Any restraint im-
posed in advance of a final judicial determination on
the merits must similarly be limited... [to] the shortest
fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.
Moreover, we are well aware that, even after expiration
of a temporary restraint, an administrative refusal to
license, signifying the censor's view that the film is un-
protected, may have a discouraging effect on the exhibi-
tor. . . . Therefore, the procedure must also assure a
prompt final judicial decision to minimize the deterrent
41. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
42. Id. at 50.
43. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
[Vol. 22
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effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a
license.44
In Freedman, the Court notes that while motion pictures may
not be subject to the precise rules that govern other forms of
expression, censorship in this area as in all others is viewed
with a "heavy presumption against its validity."45
Aside from this active form of prior restraint through licens-
ing prior to exhibition, the Court also has assailed the indirect
restraining forces. Freedman involved this aspect of censorship
also. The Court observed that the exhibitor's stake in having one
film shown might be insufficient to endure any lengthy litiga-
tion, and he might also be unwilling to go through such pro-
ceedings when he knows he can show his film in most of the
country without such a delay.48
In Bantam Books In. v. Sullivan 47 indirect restraining forces
were also attacked. In Bantam Books, the Rhode Island legis-
lature created the "Rhode Island Commission to Encourage
Morality in Youth" whose duty it was to "educate the public"
concerning the obscenity, indecency, corrupting tendency and
impure language of any material disseminated in the state. The
commission also made it a practice to notify distributors of its
findings of objectionability of their material for sale, distribu-
tion or display to the youth in Rhode Island, and to remind the
distributors of the commission's duty to recommend prosecution
of purveyors of obscenity to the Attorney General. Conse-
quently, many distributors stopped circulation on receipt of such
notification. Here the Court stated that any form of "legal ad-
vice" from an agency with only "informal sanctions - the threat
of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, per-
suasion, and intimidation...-14 s was in itself a form of unconsti-
tutional censorship. The Court added that such legal advice
squelched voluntary actions and bypassed the safeguards of the
criminal process.
One field in which censorship can still exert an effective
power in entertainment today is in restricting the audience. The
Court in the Ginsberg case stated that the constitutional powers
44. Id. at 58-59.
45. Id. at 57.
46. Id. at 59.
47. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
48. Id. at 67.
19701
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of the state include the regulation of the well-being of its chil-
dren and the proscription of certain materials for children's
consumption if it is rational that exposure to such materials
might be harmful.49 In Bantam Books this same idea was ex-
pressed:
Certainly in the face of rising juvenile crime and lower-
ing youth morality the State is empowered consistent
with the Constitution to use the above procedures [pub-
licize findings as to the obscene character of any pub-
lication, solicit public support in preventing such pub-
lications from reaching juveniles, to furnish such
findings to publishers, distributors and law enforcement
officials, and aid in prosecution of offenders] in at-
tempting to dispel the defilement of its youth by obscene
publications.50
This area of censorship has few opponents. Already the motion
picture industry has adopted such a code with the age limit
for "X" movies given local discretion. It is also easy to see why
such an area of censorship would be acceptable. It is an area
in which everyone agrees that harmful side effects can develop
and which has little relation to the principle issue of obscenity -
what is permissible for the general public.
III. CoxcrLUSION
The ambit of protection under the first amendment is best
illustrated by the recent case United States -v. A Motion Picture
Entitled "I AJm Guriou - Yellow."'51 The Court admitted that
this film's sexual content was presented with "greater explicit-
ness than has been seen in any other film produced for general
viewing.'*12 Sexual intercourse is depicted as well as scenes of
oral-genital activity. Yet this film was not found to be obscene.
The Court found that the film did have social value and that
while sex was a very important aspect of the film, the dominant
theme was not sex.
53
Censorship finds itself in the midst of rapidly changing con-
ceptions of what is obscene. With the power to license under
strict surveillance and regulation, with any form of informal
49. Ginsbcrg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1967).
50. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 76 (1963).
51. 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 198.
53. Id. at 199.
[Vol. 22
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restraint working under the heavy presumptions of unconstitu-
tionality, the role of censorship is being reduced to a bare
minimum. An examination of current trends in entertainment is
indicative of the imminent death of censorship. In 1964, Lenny
Bruce's obscenity conviction for his use of four-letter words and
gestures indicative of masturbation on the stage was reversed in
Illinois.54 On Broadway, Hair and off Broadway Ok, Caicutta
utilize scenes involving the nudity of men and women as well as
a barrage of four-letter dialogue, and neither show has been
closed. In California, "toplessness" is becoming passe, and the
state is witnessing the advent of the "bottomless" era. Television
entertainment is becoming increasingly permissive and allows
the use of sexual jokes and comedy sketches.
In this mood of permissiveness in expression, the ranks of ad-
vocates of the complete abolition of the censor are increasing.
Justices Douglas and Black are firm in their convictions of this
complete abolition as every obscenity decision indicates. Legal
writers are also advocating this position:
There should be no obscenity legislation or litigation
as such. If there is conduct which amounts to a breach
of the peace, indecent exposure, contributing to the
delinqency of a minor, or the like, prosecute such con-
duct. But do not censor what individuals read, see or
hear.
In the long run we would be better off if we had no
obscenity legislation at all. The pornographers would
have had their day and that would be that.55
While the Supreme Court has not abolished censorship theo-
retically, the practical effect of its decisions has rendered the
censor virtually powerless. The increasing restrictiveness of the
test for obscenity is indicative of the Court's present philosophy
toward censorship: "The Constitution guarantees, in short, a
society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity
of its members to choose."56 In the atmosphere of this philoso-
phy, the censor will find it extremely difficult to litigate
obscenity cases successfully.
JAms Boycn PimssLr, JR.
54. People v. Bruce, 31 Ill. 2d 459, 202 N.E2d 497 (1964).
55. Rogge, The High Court of Obscenity, 41 RocxY MT. L. REv. 1, 7 (1969).
56. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1967).
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